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CHOICE OF LAW IN PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS:
ORDER FOR THE PRACTITIONER IN A
REIGN OF CHAOS
Edward S. Digges, Jr.t
Michael T. Whartonf
The law on "choice of law" in the various states and
in the federal courts is a veritable jungle, which, if
the law can be found out, leads not to a "rule of ac-
tion" but a reign of chaos dominated in each case by
the judge's "informed guess" as to what some other
state than the one in which he sits would hold its law
to be.m
Products move today in streams of commerce which cross
state, and often international, boundaries. When litigation con-
cerning the liabilityfor injury or damage caused by these prod-
uctsfollows, choice of lawptays a crucial role in determining the
rights, remedies, and defenses available to the parties. In this
article, the authors identify the issues which plaintiffs and de-
fendants should consider in multi-*risdictional product liability
actions and setforth the basic rufesfor tort and contract choice
of law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unique and complex choice of law issues are arising frequently in
product liability lawsuits due to the increased activity of manufacturing
t B.A., Princeton University, 1968; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law,
1971. Mr. Digges is a partner in the law firm of Piper & Marbury.
t B.A., University of Virginia, 1978; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law,
1981. Mr. Wharton is an associate with the law firm of Piper & Marbury.
1. In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (emphasis in origi-
nal). Other courts and scholars have echoed this sentiment. For example, in For-
syth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1975), Judge Kilkenny prefaced
his opinion by writing that "[tlhis appeal presents a classic example of the wilder-
ness in which courts sometimes find themselves when searching for solutions to
problems arising under the judicial nightmare known as Conflict of Laws." Id at
609. Dean Prosser articulated the oft-quoted witticism that "Itihe realm of the
conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited
by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters in
strange and inomprehensive jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost
when engulfed or entangled in it." Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L.
REV. 959, 971 (1953).
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firms in various markets.2 Typically, a legal action seeking redress be-
cause of a defective product is potentially maintainable in one of sev-
eral jurisdictions. For example, in Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc.,3
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit grappled
with the question of which state's law applied to an action brought in
Iowa by an Oregon resident who, though a Washington resident at the
time his hand was injured in a grenade explosion, was stationed at Ft.
Benning, Georgia, where the injury occurred. The grenade had been
assembled in Texas by one defendant, though it contained a fuse which
had been manufactured in Iowa by the other defendant.'
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (1971) defines its subject
matter as "that part of the law of each state which determines what effect is given
to the fact that the case may have a significant relationship to more than one
state." The RESTATEMENT specifies the reason for choice of law: "[t]he world is
composed of territorial states having separate and differing systems of law.
Events and transactions occur, and issues arise, that may have a significant rela-
tionship to more than one state, making necessary a special body of rules and
methods for their ordering and resolution." Id § 1.
3. 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974).
4. The Eighth Circuit concluded that Iowa law applied. Inasmuch as the product
liability law of two arguably relevant jurisdictions, Georgia and Iowa, differed
significantly, this decision might have determined the outcome of the case. De-
fendants argued that Georgia law should apply because the injury occurred there.
Georgia had not adopted strict liability at the time of initiation of the lawsuit.
Plaintiff claimed that the law of Iowa, which had adopted strict liability, applied.
The court reached its choice of law decision by applying Iowa conflict of laws
rules, as it was required to do by virtue of the Supreme Court's decision in Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (discussed infra note 32 and
accompanying text). At that time, Iowa adhered to the significant relationship
concept as its conflicts rule. The Eighth Circuit found that Iowa, both as the fo-
rum state and, more importantly, as the situs of the manufacture of the fuse, had
an interest in the litigation which outweighed any interests entertained by other,
arguably relevant, jurisdictions.
Choice of law issues are assuming an international character as well. In
Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Pa. 1979), rey'd, 630 F.2d 149
(3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), the courts wrestled with state law and
the law of a foreign country. This product liability case involved wrongful death
claims arising out of the crash of a small private airplane in Scotland. The air-
plane had been assembled in Pennsylvania, and its propeller was manufactured
and designed in Ohio. The plane had been owned, operated, and maintained
throughout both the United States and the United Kingdom. The plaintiff-per-
sonal representative was a citizen of the United States and a resident of Califor-
nia, while those killed in the crash, including the pilot, were Scottish citizens. The
action was instituted in a California state court, removed to a California federal
court, and then transferred to a federal court in Pennsylvania.
The Pennsylvania district court dismissed the action on grounds of forum
non conveniens, albeit on the condition that defendants abide by their stipulation
to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Scotland and to waive the Scottish
statute of limitations. The court found in its analysis of the factors to consider in
forum non conveniens cases: (1) that significant evidence and witnesses were lo-
cated in Scotland and accordingly beyond the reach of compulsory process of a
federal court; (2) that there was a related action pending in a court in the United
Kingdom; and (3) that the law of Scotland would be applicable to certain aspects
of the suit.
The Third Circuit reversed and remanded, finding, inter alia, that the district
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The potential maintainability of a product liability action in one of
several jurisdictions is, however, only part of the difficulty. Diverse
laws both with respect to choice of law and the other substantive as-
pects of product litigation present seemingly insurmountable obstacles
to choice of law determinations. Yet, inasmuch as a judicial decision
on a choice of law issue can be and often is outcome-determinative, the
rules are of crucial tactical significance for all parties involved in prod-
uct liability lawsuits.
For the plaintiff, his counsel must first identify, given venue and
jurisdiction restrictions, those forums in which an action can be fied.
Counsel must then determine the choice of law rules utilized by those
jurisdictions and what substantive law would control, under the appli-
cable choice of law rules, for each potential forum. Based on that de-
termination, the most favorable forum can be selected.
Defendants can employ a similar methodology. Though the plain-
tiff initially selects the forum, defendants should remember that a
transfer opportunity may be available. This removal possibility can be
tactically advantageous.5
Upon reaching an understanding of a plaintiff's legal theories, de-
fendants must then ascertain, from statute or case law, the choice of law
rule applicable to the causes of action being posited. Based on that
determination, defendants may be in a position to argue that the fo-
rum's choice of law rules require the application of the substantive law
of a more favorable jurisdiction.
court had erred in its determination that Scottish law would govern a substantial
part of the case. 630 F.2d at 171.
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit. The Court held that the ap-
pellate court had erred in basing its decision, at least in part, on the ground that
forum non conveniens dismissal is barred automatically when the law of the alter-
native forum (Scotland) is less favorable to the plaintiff than the law of the forum
chosen by the plaintiff (California). The Supreme Court emphasized that the pos-
sibility of an unfavorable change in law should not, by itself, bar dismissal. 454
U.S. at 254. Given its reasoning, the Supreme Court did not reach the issue of
choice of laws, other than to say that the district court had not otherwise abused
its discretion.
5. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd, 630 F.2d 149
(3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), is a particularly telling example of
effective tactical use by a defendant of the transfer provision in a choice of law
context. The action was instituted against Piper Aircraft Company, the airplane
manufacturer, and Hartzell Propeller, Inc., the propeller manufacturer, in a Cali-
fornia state court. The defendants removed the action to a California federal
court, and Hartzell then moved to transfer the action to Pennsylvania pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) (venue). The California district court granted the
transfer motion as well as Hartzell's motion to quash service of process based on
the due process considerations set out in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945). Piper did not challenge service of process. However, the
California district court did not dismiss the action against Hartzell since valid
service against it was possible in Pennsylvania. Thus, as to defendant Piper, the
Pennsylvania court applied the choice of law rules of California. As to Hartzell, it
applied the choice of law rules of Pennsylvania. 479 F. Supp. at 734-35.
Baltimore Law Review
This article is intended to highlight choice of law issues frequently
arising in product liability actions, as well as to discuss the general
rules for choice of law determination currently employed in the various
American jurisdictions. Discussion is limited to the three traditional
product liability theories of recovery: negligence, warranty, and strict
liability, as well as to a comparative newcomer, misrepresentation.6
II. IMPLICATIONS OF CHOICE OF LAW TO PLAINTIFF
AND DEFENDANT
Typically, a plaintiff in a product liability case will premise his
action on strict liability, negligence, and warranty theories. If the fo-
rum state characterizes an action for breach of warranty as sounding in
tort, then tort choice of law rules will apply to all issues in the case.
However, if the jurisdiction characterizes a warranty action as sound-
ing in contract, or if it applies the choice of law rule contained in the
Uniform Commercial Code7 in a manner that differs from its apphca-
tion of tort choice of law rules, then the rules of different states might
apply to different issues in the case. The law of one state might govern
the tort counts, and the law of another the warranty counts." For ex-
ample, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 9 a plaintiff sought to
recover profits lost while damage caused to his commercial tractor-
trailer as a result of a tire blowout was being repaired. The tire was
purchased in Maryland, but the accident occurred in Arizona. The
Maryland trial court applied Maryland law to the warranty counts, and
Arizona law to the negligence and strict liability counts.' 0
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965); see also infra note 24.
7. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1978).
8. "Depecage" is the process of applying rules of different states on the basis of the
precise issue involved. Professor Reese has stated:
Choice of the applicable law should frequently depend upon the
issue involved. The search in these instances is not for the state whose
law will be applied to govern all issues in a case; rather it is for the rule
of law that can most approximately be applied to govern the particular
issue . ..
It also seems probable that greater use of depecage will be an inevi-
table by-product of the development of satisfactory rules of choice of
law. In contrast to the broad rules that have been tried and found want-
ing, the new rules, if we are indeed to develop such rules, are likely to be
narrow in scope and large in number.
In short, a willingness to make a liberal use of depecage would seem
a prerequisite to the satisfactory development of narrow rules of choice
of law.
Reese, Depecage." A Common Phenomenon in Choice Of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
58, 58-60 (1973).
9. 53 Md. App. 106, 452 A.2d 192 (1982), aff'dper curiam, 456 A.2d 930 (1983).
10. Inasmuch as choice of law was not an issue on appeal, the fact that the court
applied Arizona law to the tort counts is not apparent on the face of the opinion.
Defendant decided to rely on Arizona law on the tort counts because at the time
of trial there were reported Arizona decisions prohibiting economic loss recovery
in negligence or strict liability. There were no decisions on point in Maryland
[Vol. 12
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Choice of law rules may affect the substantive standard of liability
applicable to an action, as well as defenses which may be asserted. Not
all jurisdictions recognize strict liability in tort, " and among those that
do not all have adopted the particular elements of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts. 2 Additionally, defendant's ability to shift and distribute
a loss on comparative fault theories' 3 and on theories of contribution
appellate courts. After filing its notice of intention to rely on Arizona law, de-
fendant moved for and was granted partial summary judgment on this issue. The
appeal concerned only the warranty count, which was governed by Maryland law.
11. Delaware, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia do not have strict liability
in tort. See, e.g., Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 968 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1980) (UCC provisions on sales of goods preempt the field, thus preventing the
extension of the doctrine of strict liability in tort to the law of sales); Back v.
Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 378 N.E.2d 964 (1978) (Massachusetts warranty re-
covery is coextensive with the strict liability recovery which is permitted in other
states); Coffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 30 N.C. App. 134, 226 S.E.2d 534 (1976)
(court declined to adopt strict liability).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) specifies:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Not all jurisdictions require that the plaintiff prove that the defective condi-
tion was "unreasonably dangerous." See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck,
593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d
1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1972); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81
N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979). Though Pennsylvania technically has retained the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement, its courts prohibit a jury charge on this
element. Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
13. The modern comparative fault doctrine has taken a variety of forms, some fash-
ioned by the courts, Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981);
Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Scott v.
Rizzo, 96 N M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256
S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979), and others drawn by state legislatures. ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979); C.Z. CODE tit. 4, § 1357 (1963); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West 1980); GA.
CODE ANN. § 51-11-7 (1982); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976); IDAHO CODE
§ 6-801 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1976); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2323
(West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS.
ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 41-141 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1979); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1411 (McKin-
ney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19
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and indemnity may be affected.' 4 Some states have abolished joint and
several liability,15 and not all states permit contribution on the same
basis. 16
Choice of law decisions may affect the identity of proper parties to
a product liability action. 7 Though the Uniform Commercial Code is
nearly universal, 8 some jurisdictions still require privity of contract,' 9
and some do not extend warranty protection to bystanders.2"
(Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 18.470 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1980); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 20-9-2 (1979); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § I (Vernon Supp. 1980);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1451 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.010 (Supp. 1980);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1981); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977).
14. See infra notes 15-16.
15. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19
(A)(2)(Page 1981).
16. Compare MD. ANN. CODE, art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1978) (pro rata basis) with FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.31(3) (West 1979) (degree of fault basis).
17. Regardless of plaintiff's theory, there is no difficulty with standing if the one who
is injured or damaged is a purchaser or user of the product. There may be
problems if the potential plaintiff is a bystander. See infra note 20.
There is a large class of potential defendants, though not all jurisdictions
allow suits against all of them. The chain of distribution may include the manu-
facturer, wholesaler, distributor, importer, and retailer. Additionally, potential
defendants might include component manufacturers, commercial purchasers, i-
censors, bailors, used-product sellers, repairers, putative owners, endorsers, and
successor manufacturers.
18. The UCC has been enacted by every state except Louisiana, by the District of
Columbia, and by the Virgin Islands. See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE xi (1981).
19. Most jurisdictions have eliminated the privity requirement in warranty actions
under the UCC. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960), followed in the majority ofjurisdictions, extended a manufacturer's liabil-
ity to remote purchasers and forseeable users.
The UCC acknowledges the trend to abrogate the privity requirement but
neither approves nor disapproves of the Henningsen rule. It specifies:
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the
family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section
is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case
law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells,
extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
UCC § 2-313, comment 3 (1978).
The privity requirement still exists in some states. See, e.g., Miles v. Bell
Helicoptor Co., 385 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Hardesty v. Andro Corp.-
Webster Div., 555 P.2d 1030 (Okla. 1976). Some states which retain the privity
requirement make an exception when food, drink, drugs, or a dangerous instru-
mentality is involved. Isaacson v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 438 F. Supp. I
(E.D.N.C. 1976); Marrillia v. Lyn Craft Boat Co., 271 So. 2d 204 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1973). Some states require privity in economic loss cases only. Addresso-
graph-Multigraph Corp. v. Zink, 273 Md. 277, 329 A.2d 28 (1974); Hole v. Gen-
eralMotors Corp., 83 A.D.2d 715, 442 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1981).
20. The standing of an injured party to assert a claim for breach of warranty depends
upon which version of section 2-318 of the UCC has been adopted by the state
whose law controls. The UCC drafters provided three alternatives. A bystander
would normally be excluded under alternative A ("[any natural person who is in
19831 Product Liability Actions
Choice of law may make a difference in the amount of recovery as
well. The type and amount of damages recoverable under wrongful
death and survival statutes vary among jurisdictions.2 In addition,
while the negligence theory of recovery is universal, jurisdictions differ
on the types of injuries for which they will permit recovery. 22 More-
over, as with the negligence theory, not all jurisdictions which have
adopted some form of strict liability permit recovery for the same types
of damages.23
Finally, the law of a particular jurisdiction may provide theories of
recovery other than the traditional theories of negligence, warranty,
and strict liability. Among these theories are misrepresentation, 24 mar-
the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home"), but appears
included within the ambit of alternative B or C ("[a]ny natural person who may
reasonably be expected to. . .be affected by the goods..."). It is important to
note that alternatives A and B both require that the claimant suffer personal in-
jury to have standing, but that alternative C does not.
Jurisdictions which have adopted strict liability in tort exhibit a clear trend
toward granting a bystander standing to sue. See, e.g., Elmore v. American Mo-
tors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (en banc) (vehicle
veered across center line of the highway and collided head-on with plaintiff); An-
not., 33 A.L.R.3d 415 (1970) (compendium of bystander cases).
21. See, e.g., Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974). In Turcotte, a
Rhode Island resident instituted a diversity action in the United States District
Court for Rhode Island to recover damages for the alleged wrongful death of his
son. The son was killed when the vehicle in which he was a passenger was struck
by another vehicle in Massachusetts. The owner of the vehicle in which the dece-
dent was riding was a Rhode Island resident, and the vehicle had been purchased
in Massachusetts. The driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident was a
Massachusetts resident. At that time damages under the Rhode Island wrongful
death statute were quasi-compensatory in nature and there was no ceiling on re-
covery. On the other hand, damages under the Massachusetts wrongful death
statute were measured by a punitive standard and there was a $50,000 limit on
recovery.
The First Circuit held that the trial court had correctly applied Rhode Is-
land's interest weighing approach to tort choice of law questions. Rhode Island,
the court found, had a strong interest in insuring adequate compensation for a
wrongful death. See also Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d 656 (5th
Cir. 1968) (under Florida law, Illinois limit on wrongful death damages would
apply).
22. See infra note 23.
23. States differ as to negligence and strict liability recovery for economic loss. The
majority of jurisdictions which have considered the issue have not permitted eco-
nomic loss recovery under these tort theories. See, e.g., Clark v. International
Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978). However, a minority of juris-
dictions permit such recovery. See, e.g., West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.
2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
24. The misrepresentation theory is encompassed in the RESTATEMENT which
specifies:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, la-
bels, or otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material
fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel sold by him is sub-
Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 12
ket share liability,2 alternative liability,26 enterprise liability,27 and
concert of action liability.28
A trend towards uniformity in the substantive bases of liability im-
posed for defective products which cause death, personal injury, prop-
erty damage, or economic loss is emerging. However, this trend has not
reached the point where such uniformity exists. Thus, for the plaintiff,
assuming the existence of personal jurisdiction and proper venue, the
substantive law that will apply to the action may dictate the choice of
the forum. For the defendant, the applicable choice of law rule may
determine whether the law of another, more favorable, jurisdiction
may also arguably be applicable. Indeed, success or failure may hinge
ject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of the chattel caused by
justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965).
Many jurisdictions have adopted this additional theory of recovery. See, e.g.,
American Safety Equip. Corp. v. Winkler, 640 P.2d 216 (Colo. 1982) (en banc);
Klages v. General Ordinance Equip. Co., 240 Pa. Super. 356, 367 A.2d 304 (1976).
25. See SindeU v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). See generally Note, Market Share Liability:
An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARv. L. REV. 668 (1981); Note,
Industry- Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 980 (1979).
26. See Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (en banc).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3)(1965) is an exception to the general
rule of section 433B(1) which places on a plaintiff the burden of proving
causation:
(3) Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is
proved that the harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of
them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden
is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.
Id § 433B(l).
27. See Hall v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972),
afl'd, 519 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1975); Namn v. Charles C. Frost & Co., 178 N.J.
Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981); Davis v. Yearwood, 612 S.W.2d 917 (Tenn. App.
1980); see also Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46
FoRDHAm L. REV. 963 (1978). See generally Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp.
1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
28. In regard to the concert of action liability theory RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 876 (1979) provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of an-
other, one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert
with the other pursuant to a common design with him, or (b) knows that
the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or (c)
gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result
and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty
to the third person.
See generally Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich.
App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979).
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on making the right selection. 29
III. THRESHOLD DETERMINATION: SUBSTANCE OR
PROCEDURE?
Both federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction 3° and state
courts distinguish between substantive and procedural matters for pur-
poses of determining which law to apply. In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Manufacturing Co., ' the Supreme Court held that a state's
choice of law rules are substantive rather than procedural.3 2 Thus, fed-
29. Most jurisdictions require a party intending to rely on nonforum substantive law
to provide both court and counsel with timely notice of his intention to do so. In
Maryland, a party intending to rely on the law of a foreign jurisdiction must give
timely notice by filing a notice of intention to so rely:
A party may also present to the trial court any admissible evidence of
foreign laws, but, to enable a party to offer evidence of the law in an-
other jurisdiction or to ask that judicial notice be taken of it, reasonable
notice shall be given to the adverse parties either in pleadings or by other
written notice.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-504 (1980) (part of the UNIFORM JUDI-
CIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAW ACT).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has stated that if no unfair surprise would
result, notice of intention to rely on foreign law may be filed at any time up to the
start of trial. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975).
Such situations are rare; the prudent course is to provide notice well in advance of
trial.
Absent such notice the trial court is not required to take judicial notice of the
law of the relevant state, other than to presume that it is like Maryland's. See
Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975); Von Frank
v. Hershey Nat'l Bank, 269 Md. 138, 306 A.2d 207 (1973); Coppage v. Resolute
Ins. Co., 264 Md. 261, 285 A.2d 626 (1972); Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125,
252 A.2d 171 (1969); Leatherbury v. Leatherbury, 233 Md. 344, 196 A.2d 883
(1964). However, in its discretion, a court may take judicial notice of foreign law
even when the statutory requirement of notice was not given and proof of the
foreign law was not presented. Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 288,
336 A.2d 118 (1975).
30. A plaintiff may file his product liability suit in federal court pursuant to the diver-
sity jurisdiction which exists by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) if there is the
requisite diversity of citizenship between the parties, and if the amount in contro-
versy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds ten thousand dollars. Additionally,
a defendant may remove such an action from the state court in which it was
originally fied to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).
31. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
32. Id at 496. Reaffirming Klaxon, the Supreme Court has noted that "[a] federal
court in a diversity case is not free to engraft on to those state [conflict of law]
rules exceptions or modifications which may commend themselves to the state in
which the federal court sits." Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3,
4 (1975).
There is an exception to the rule that a federal court exercising diversity juris-
diction must apply the substantive law, including choice of law rules, of the forum
in which it sits: transfer of an action between federal courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1976). In Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), the Supreme
Court held that when a diversity action is so transferred, the transferee district
court is obligated to apply the state law that would have been applied had there
been no change of venue. The Court wrote:
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eral courts will utilize the conflicts rules of the state in which it sits.
State courts employ a test which distinguishes between substantive
and procedural matters on the basis of whether a rule concerns the
manner and means by which a right to recover is enforced.33 If the rule
is procedural, the law of the forum will be applied.34 If a state deter-
mines a particular rule to be substantive, it will apply the law of a juris-
diction determined by application of the forum's choice of law rules.35
At the state level this substantive/procedural determination is not
made on the basis of whether a particular rule will affect the outcome
of the litigation. The classic examples are limitations statutes. Tradi-
tionally, the common law recognized statutes of limitations as proce-
dural and thus applied the law of the forum.36 The theory was that
[a] change of venue under § 1404(a) generally should be, with re-
spect to state law, but a change of courtrooms ...
Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal
courts in different states is attributable to our federal system, which
leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the
right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors.
Id at 638, 639 n.38 (quoting Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,
496 (1941)). See also Loughan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 624 F.2d 726, 729
(5th Cir. 1980); Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790, 792-93 (10th Cir.
1979); Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopter Co., 491 F. Supp. 611,
614 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Sibley v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines, 454 F. Supp. 425,
426-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
The rationale for this exception is to avoid substantial prejudice to plaintiffs.
The section might otherwise become a forum shopping instrument and courts
would be reluctant to grant transfers, despite considerations of convenience, if to
do so would prejudice the claim of a plaintiff who initially had selected a permis-
sible forum.
33. State courts in product liability actions do not simply serve as neutral forums, as
do federal courts. Since state courts are not limited by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), or the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976), they are
free to choose what they feel to be the preferable rule rather than to determine
what is imposed upon them by another sovereign.
34. The lexfori (law of the forum) principle rests on considerations of convenience,
practicality, and efficiency. The courts of the forum cannot be expected to con-
stantly familiarize themselves with the procedural rules of diverse jurisdictions
"involving purely procedural matters such as discovery techniques, calendar prac-
tice, service of papers and other 'housekeeping' rules." 3 L. FRUMER & M. FRIED-
MAN, PRODUCTS LIABILIrY § 38.02 (1982).
35. See, e.g., Doughty v. Prettyman, 219 Md. 83, 148 A.2d 438 (1959).
36. See Morton v. Texas Welding & Mfg. Co., 408 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Tex. 1976), a
product liability action for personal injuries caused by the explosion of a propane
gas tank manufactured by the defendant. Plaintiffs brought their action on theo-
ries of negligence and warranty. The defendant moved to dismiss, claiming that
both actions were barred by limitations. Noting that under Texas confficts rules a
limitations statute is procedural, the court applied the Texas tort limitations pe-
riod to bar the negligence action, but held that the warranty counts were not
barred by the four year limitations period. Id at 9, 11; see also Brown v. Morrow
Mach. Co., 411 F. Supp. 1162 (D. Conn. 1976).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976), a federal transferee court must apply
the law that the transferor court would have applied, including its limitations stat-
ute. In Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979), a prod-
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statutes of limitations bar the remedy, not the right, in the state where
they are applied. However, it is clear that statutes of limitations can be,
and are, factors in forum shopping.37
In response, a majority of states have enacted borrowing stat-
utes.38 Under these laws limitations statutes from another jurisdiction
are borrowed by the forum to discourage forum shopping. Typically,
the statutes apply to nonresidents only, and the statute borrowed is
from the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose or accrued.
Stafford v. International Harvester Co. 39 is representative of the
types of problems that arise in the application of a borrowing statute.
Plaintiff, a New Jersey resident, brought a product liability action in a
federal court in New York for injuries incurred in Pennsylvania when
the steering mechanism on an International Harvester truck failed. In-
ternational Harvester is a Delaware corporation. Its principal place of
business is not in New York. Eastco Truck Sales, Inc., a New York
corporation with its principal place of business in New York, was also a
defendant. Eastco had repaired the steering mechanism on the truck
shortly before the accident occurred.
Pennsylvania had a two year limitations statute, New York a three
year one. The action was brought between two and three years after
uct liability action transferred from Mississippi to Kansas, the lower court applied
the Kansas two-year limitations statute to dismiss the action. The limitations pe-
riod of the transferor forum, Mississippi, was six years, which would have allowed
the action. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the Kansas court was not
free to predict that the Mississippi court would not have applied its own lexfori
rule.
In a number of federal decisions, the traditional rule that statutes of limita-
tions are procedural has been rejected. See, e.g., Henry v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 508 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1975), where the Third Circuit applied the confficts rules
of New Jersey as established in Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d
412 (1973). The court found that the governmental or state interest approach to
choice of law questions applies to procedural matters as well as substantive law.
See also Farrier v. May Dept. Stores Co., 357 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1973).
37. See Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979).
38. See ALA. CODE § 6-2-17 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.220 (1973); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-506(a) (1982); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 361 (West 1982); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-80-118 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8121 (1974); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 12-307 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.10 (West 1982); HAwAII REV. STAT.
§ 657-9 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 5-239 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 21 (1973);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-6 (Bums 1971); IOWA CODE § 614.7 (1962); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-516 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 413.330 (1962); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
3532 (West 1953); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 866 (1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 260, § 9 (West 1959); MICH. ComP. LAWS. § 600.5861 (1968); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 15-1-65 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.190 (Supp. 1983); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-2-104 (1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-215 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 11.020 (1979); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 202 (McKinney 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-21 (1969 & Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.260 (1981); 12 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 39 (Purdon 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-18 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 28-1-112 (1980); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN art. 5542 (Vernon 1958); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-12-45 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.290 (1960); W. VA.
CODE § 55-2-13 (1981); Wyo. STAT. § 1-3-117 (1977).
39. 668 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1981).
Baltimore Law Review
the accident. New York's borrowing statute provided that if a cause of
action accrued outside of New York in favor of a nonresident a New
York court would apply that state's statute of limitations, if to do so
would bar the action. 4' In Stafford, the issue was whether the cause of
action accrued in New York or Pennsylvania for purposes of the bor-
rowing statute.
The court held that the New York statute could not be applied to
bar the action against the New York corporation, since the New York
corporation would not have been amenable to suit in Pennsylvania."'
However, since the Delaware corporation could have been sued in
Pennsylvania, the statute barred the action against it.
In arriving at this decision, the court first had to decide whether to
apply the traditional lex loci delicti rule, or the modem grouping of
contacts rule,4 2 to determine where the cause of action accrued. Since
the issue was then undecided by the New York state courts, the court
took a conservative view and applied the place of injury rule.4 3
But the court's inquiry did not stop there. It was troubled by the
fact that, since plaintiff could not have sued the New York corporation
in Pennsylvania initially, the anti-forum shopping purpose of New
York's borrowing statute would not be promoted if it were to bar plain-
tiff's action as to the Delaware corporation. The court therefore held
that a cause of action under New York's borrowing statute could not
have accrued as to a particular defendant in a state which could not
exercise jurisdiction over that defendant.44
Even in those jurisdictions which have not enacted borrowing stat-
utes, the applicable limitations statute of the state whose law otherwise
applies may bar the right itself, not just the remedy. This happens
when, for example, a limitations statute is contained within a statute
creating the plaintiffs cause of action. The statute is interpreted as sub-
stantive,45 and the action usually will not be permitted by the forum
40. New York's borrowing statute is typical of most in the United States. It provides:
An action based upon a cause of action accruing without the state cannot
be commenced after the expiration of the time limited by the laws of
either the state or the place without the state where the cause of action
accrued, except that where the cause of action accrued in favor of a resi-
dent of the state the time limited by the laws of the state shall apply.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 202 (McKinney 1972).
41. Stafford, 668 F.2d at 154.
42. See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
43. 668 F.2d at 149-50.
44. Id at 152-53.
45. In a product liability context, there are three frequent situations in which a limita-
tions statute is contained within a statute creating plaintiff's cause of action. First,
the jurisdiction may have enacted a product liability statute which contains its
own limitations period. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 12-542, 12-551
(1982). Second, wrongful death statutes frequently contain limitations provisions.
See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 893.205(2) (West 1976). Finally, UCC § 2-725




IV. SELECTION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN TORT
Once it has been determined that an issue is substantive, the ques-
tion in a multi-jurisdictional product liability action is which states' law
will apply. A variety of philosophical methods of analysis have been
developed and adopted by different jurisdictions. It is therefore essen-
tial for the parties to know what method, or rule, has been chosen by
the forum state, and why. The particular factual pattern must be inter-
preted according to the rule of the forum jurisdiction in order to per-
suade the court which substantive law appropriately controls.
A. The Lex Loci Delicti Commissi Rule
The traditional rule of law by which conflict decisions were made
in tort cases, favored by virtually every American jurisdiction prior to
the early 1960's, was the lex loci delicti rule.47 The substantive rights of
litigants were determined by the law of the place of the wrong. This
view, which was espoused by the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 48
had its conceptual foundation in the "vested rights" doctrine. This
doctrine provided that the law of the place of the wrong gave rise to a
claim for recovery, which was considered a property right.4 ' This pre-
existing right accompanied the plaintiff into the forum, and the forum
court was asked, as a matter of comity, merely to vindicate existing
rights.50
Though the rule itself may have been universal, there was no uni-
formity in determining the place of the "wrong"; that is, determining
which state "the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an
alleged tort takes place."'" This was interpreted by most jurisdictions
46. See generaly 3 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 38.02 (1982).
This approach is endorsed by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS §§142, 143 (1971).
47. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967); Abend-
schein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969). See generally 3 L.
FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 38.05[l] (1982).
48. The original RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) was superseded in its
entirety by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). Under
the first RESTATEMENT, with minor exceptions, all substantive questions relating
to the existence of a tort claim were governed by the local law of the "place of
wrong." RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 376 (1934).
49. The "vested rights" theory was explained by the Supreme Court in Slater v. Mexi-
can Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904): "[t]he theory of the foreign suit is that
although the act complained of was subject to no law having force in the forum, it
gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the
person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found." Id at 126.
50. See generally 2 J. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935); J. STORY,
. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d. ed. 1941).
51. This was described in section 377 of the original RESTATEMENT as "the state
where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes
place." Since a tort is the product of wrongful conduct and of resulting injury,
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to mean the state where the injury occurred.52 But a small minority
held the place of injury to be where the product was either manufac-
tured or maintained.53
Maryland is one of the few jurisdictions that continues to adhere
to the traditional lex loci delicti choice of law rule for tort actions. In
Hauch v. Connor,54 the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the
conservative rule, rejecting the most significant relationship approach
to choice of law posited by section 145 of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws. -5 The court gave as reasons for its decision the prin-
ciple of stare decisis and the predictability and certainty which the rule
provides. 56 The court also noted the rule's "recogni[tion of] legitimate
and since the injury follows the conduct, the state of the "last event" is the state
where the injury occurred.
52. See Babcock v. Maple Leaf, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Continental
Oil Co. v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 409 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Tex. 1976); see also
Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958); Brooks v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1966); La
Prelle v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 85 F. Supp. 182 (D. Kan. 1949); Hopkins v. Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
53. See, e.g., Bender v. Hearst Corp., 263 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1959); Killpack v. Nat'l
Old Line Ins. Co., 229 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1956); Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 183 F.2d 479 (10th Cir. 1950).
54. 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983). Plaintiffs and defendant were Maryland resi-
dents. At the time of the accident, all were employed by Hertz Corporation.
Plaintiffs were passengers in their employer's vehicle, which, while being driven
by defendant, was on a round trip from Baltimore-Washington International Air-
port in Maryland to Dover, Delaware to pick up rental vehicles. The accident
occurred in Delaware. Delaware's Workmen's Compensation Act prohibits co-
employee suits under these circumstances; Maryland's Workmen's Compensation
Act does not.
Defendant, relying on the lex loci delicti principle, contended that Delaware
law, which precluded the suit, was dispositive. Plaintiff argued that the Maryland
court should abandon lex loci delicti for the RESTATEMENT SECOND'S most signifi-
cant relationship test. In the alternative, plaintiff argued that the Maryland act
applied because the General Assembly did not intend to preclude co-employees
from suits of this nature.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held lex loci delicti still to be the viable
choice of law rule in Maryland for tort actions. Hauch, 295 Md. at 123, 453 A.2d
at 1209. However, the rule was not dispositive in the case. The conflicting law
was workmen's compensation, not tort. Id at 125, 453 A.2d at 1210. The court
noted that both plaintiff and defendant made claims under the Maryland Work-
men's Compensation statute, both lived in Maryland, and the employer was a
Maryland corporation. Therefore, the court concluded those "greater Maryland
interests" determined the threshold question of the right to bring suit in Mary-
land. Id at 133-34, 453 A.2d at 1214.
55. See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
56. Hauch, 295 Md. at 125, 453 A.2d at 1210; see, e.g., Billingsley v. Lincoln Nat'l
Bank, 271 Md. 683, 320 A.2d 34 (1974); Vernon v. Aubinoe, 259 Md. 159, 269
A.2d 620 (1970); Brady v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 254 Md. 598, 255 A.2d 429
(1969); Hutzell v. Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1969); Joffre v. Canada Dry
Ginger Ale, Inc., 122 Md. 1, 158 A.2d 631 (1960); Doughty v. Prettyman, 219 Md.
83, 148 A.2d 438 (1959); Cunningham v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 25 Md. App.
253, 334 A.2d 120 (1975).
In White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1965), the court of appeals
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interests which the foreign state has in the incidents of the act giving
rise to the injury. '5 7 Finally, it noted that when wrongful conduct oc-
curs in a foreign state, "it poses a direct threat to persons and property
in that state." 58
Previously, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had specifically
held that lex loci delicti is the applicable choice of law rule in product
liability actions. In Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 5 9 a passenger al-
leged that the injuries he sustained in a North Carolina automobile
accident were caused and enhanced by defects in the vehicle, which
had been purchased in Maryland. The court held that under the rule of
addressed the merits of the lex loci delicti rule at some length and indicated that
change should come from the legislature. Id at 355, 223 A.2d at 767. At the same
time, however, the White court was able to avoid what might have been perceived
as a "harsh" result under lex loci delicti by finding that the trial court had erred in
its determination that there was insufficient evidence of gross negligence to send
the case to the jury. Id at 362, 223 A.2d at 771.
57. Hauch, 295 Md. at 125, 453 A.2d at 1210. The court specified the nature of those
interests: "[tlhe foreign state's resources in the form of police protection, medical
assistance and highway maintenance, to mention a few, are expended whenever
an automobile collision occurs within its borders." Id
58. Id, see also Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407, 374 A.2d 1061 (1977) (no compelling
reason presented to abandon lex loci delicti).
59. 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976) (Frericks II)," see also Frericks v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975) (Frericks I). Both Frericks decisions
arose out of the same set of facts. Plaintiff, who was a passenger in the vehicle,
was seriously injured when the driver apparently fell asleep at the wheel and the
car left the road and overturned. The accident occurred in North Carolina, but
the vehicle had been purchased in Maryland. Plaintiff and his father filed suit
against the manufacturer and the dealer in Maryland; the trial court sustained
defendants' demurrers to the negligence and warranty counts. The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland reversed except as to the negligence count against the dealer.
With respect to the negligence counts, the court of appeals in Frericks I de-
clined to take notice of North Carolina law because defendants did not give notice
of intention to rely on it. Instead, it followed Maryland law, which did recognize
a cause of action in negligence on a "crashworthy" theory. Thus, it held that the
negligence count did state a cause of action against the manufacturer, but not as
to the dealer against whom no specific acts of negligence were alleged. Frericks I,
274 Md. at 306, 336 A.2d at 128.
The court of appeals applied Maryland law to evaluate the sufficiency of the
warranty counts because the vehicle had been sold there. It found that plaintiffs
had stated a cause of action for breach of warranty against both defendants. Id
On remand to the circuit court, both defendants filed general issue pleas, and
the manufacturer gave notice of intention to rely on North Carolina law. Both
defendants then moved for summary judgment. The manufacturer contended,
with respect to the negligence count, that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action
under North Carolina law. Both defendants contended, with respect to the war-
ranty counts, that plaintiffs were barred from warranty recovery by their failure to
give the notice required by UCC § 2-607(3)(a)(1978).
The trial court granted both motions for summary judgment. The Maryland
court of appeals, in Frericks H, reversed. The court held first that third-party
beneficiaries such as the injured plaintiff are not required to give notice under
section 2-607(3)(a). 278 Md. at 316, 363 A.2d at 466. It then concluded that the
negligence count was sufficient to state a cause of action under North Carolina
law. Id at 319, 363 A.2d at 468.
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lex loci delicti, North Carolina's product liability law governed the tort
cause of action, which sounded in negligence. Though Maryland had
not yet adopted strict liability at the time of the Frericks decision, the
court of appeals has since defined a strict liability action as an action in
tort.6" There is little doubt that if presented with the specific issue, the
court of appeals would apply the lex loci delicti principle to a strict
liability cause of action.6'
The virtues of the traditional rule are obvious. It is simple to ap-
ply, its implications are clear, and its results are predictable.62 How-
ever, the rule is being increasingly discredited.63 It relies on a single
fortuitous circumstance to determine which law applies. This inflexi-
bility leaves no room for the policy considerations often involved in
product liability actions.' Too rigidly applied, the rule leads to unjust
results which ignore the expectations of the parties and the interests of
the states involved.
In the leading decision of Babcock v. Jackson, 65 Justice Fuld of the
Court of Appeals of New York summarized the problems with the lex
loci deficti rule:
Although espoused by such great figures as Justice Holmes
and Professor Beale, the vested rights doctrine has long since
been discredited because it fails to take account of underlying
policy considerations in evaluating the significance to be
ascribed to the circumstance that an act had a foreign situs in
determining the rights and liabilities which arise out of that
act. "The vice of the vested rights theory," it has been aptly
stated, "is that it affects to decide concrete cases upon general-
ities which do not state the practical considerations involved."
More particularly, as applied to torts, the theory ignores the
interest which jurisdictions other than that where the tort oc-
60. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
61. Other courts have not hesitated to characterize a strict liability action as an action
in tort for purposes of determining whether to apply choice of law principles for
tort. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 409 F. Supp.
288, 293-94 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
62. See, e.g., Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 1980)
("this rule promotes our interest in consistency and stability by application of a
stable and objective standard for choice of law determinations"); see also Hauch
v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 125, 453 A.2d 1207, 1210 (1983).
63. Scholars have increasingly attacked the lex loci delicti rule. See, e.g., Currie, Con-
flict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1; Currie, Survival of
Actions: 4djudication versus Automation In the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV.
205 (1958); Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori--Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58
MICH. L. REV. 637 (1960); Reese, Choice of Law. Rules orApproach, 57 CORNELL
L. REV. 315 (1972); Stumberg, "The Place of the Wrong" Torts and the Conflict of
Laws, 34 WASH. L. REv. 388 (1959).
64. One of the earliest pieces criticizing the lex loci rule was Cavers,,4 Critique of the
Choice-Of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 198 (1933). Cavers criticized the
mechanical application of a rule which ignored the facts of each case as well as
the respective purposes of the conflicting laws.
65. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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curred may have in the resolution of particular issues.6 6
To varying degrees these sentiments have been echoed by the jurisdic-
tions which have abandoned the lex loci delicti rule in favor of analysis
which would consider all relevant interests or contacts, as well as their
relative significance.67
66. Id at 478, 191 N.E.2d at 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 746-47.
67. In another leading decision abandoning the lex loci delicti rule, Chief Justice
Traynor, in Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967)
stated:
Ease of determining applicable law and uniformity of rules of decision,
however, must be subordinated to the objective of proper choice of law
in conflict cases, L e., to determine the law that most appropriately ap-
plies to the issues involved. Moreover, as jurisdiction after jurisdiction
has departed from the law of the place of the wrong as the controlling
law in tort cases, regardless of the issue involved, that law no longer
affords even a semblance of the general application that was once
thought to be its great virtue.
Id at 555, 432 P.2d at 730, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34 (citations omitted); see also Gutier-
rez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. 1979).
At least twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have rejected the
place of injury rule and adopted one of several "multiple factors" theories: Arm-
strong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 193 Ariz.
562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968); Moore v. Montes, 22 Ariz. App. 562, 529 P.2d 716
(1974); Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977) (en
banc); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); First
Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 152 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314 (1973) (en banc); Bishop v.
Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980); Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill.
2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970); Zeman v. Canton State Bank, 211 N.W.2d 346
(Iowa 1973); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968); Arnett v. Thompson,
433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Jagers
v. Royal Indemnity Co., 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973); Beaulieu v. Beaulieu, 265 A.2d
610 (Me. 1970); Pevoski v. Pevoski, 371 Mass. 358, 358 N.E.2d 416 (1976);
Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Baits v. Baits, 273
Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968);
Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969) (en banc); Clark v. Clark, 107
N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); MeUk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625
(1967); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963); Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1972); Brickner v. Gooden, 525
P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974); Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Or. 274, 428
P.2d 898 (1967); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964);
Busby v. Perini Corp., 110 R.I. 49, 290 A.2d 210 (1972); Woodward v. Stewart,
104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1968); Gutierrez v. Collins,
583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979); Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577,
555 P.2d 997 (1976) (en banc); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408
(1965). In addition, federal courts in the following jurisdictions predicted aban-
donment of the lex loci delicti concept. Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir.
1968); Williams v. Rawlings Truckline, Inc., 357 F.2d 581 (1965); Merchants Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967).
For a detailed treatment of the lex loci delicti rule and its relationship to
modem choice-of-law methodologies, see Westbrook, A Survey and Evaluation of
Competing Choice-of-Law Methodologies. The Case for Eclecticism, 40 Mo. L.
REV. 407 (1975).
Finally, at least one court has taken a middle position. In Sexton v. Ryder
Truck Rental Inc., 413 Mich. 406, 320 N.W.2d 843 (1962), the Supreme Court of
Michigan rejected lex loci delicti, but declined to adopt any other methodology,
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Even in those jurisdictions that did not abandon the lex loci delicti
rule, devices have been created to avoid its application in "difficult"
cases.68 Since under the traditional common law rule lexfori applied
to all procedural matters, a disfavored feature of the relevant jurisdic-
tion's substantive law can conveniently be characterized as procedural.
The forum law, rather than the lex loci delict, would apply on that
issue.69 Additionally, if a jurisdiction has different conflicts rules for
torts and contracts, an issue may be characterized as contractual in na-
ture, thereby both avoiding application of lex loci delicti and permitting
the application of the more favored substantive law.7" Finally, in the
most straight forward manner of avoiding the lex loci delicti rule, some
courts have flatly refused to apply a feature of the otherwise controlling
law because it is against the public policy of the forum.7'
B. The Grouping of Contacts Rule
Many credit the Court of Appeals of New York with having
started a revolution72 in the conflict of laws field by its decision in 1963
in Babcock v. Jackson. 13 The court replaced the lex loci delicti rule
with a grouping of contacts or center of gravity approach.74 In Bab-
cock, a New York resident sued the driver of a vehicle in which the
plaintiff was injured when the defendant lost control of his automobile
while driving through Ontario. At that time, Ontario had a guest stat-
ute which immunized owners or drivers of noncommercial vehicles
from suit for bodily injury or death suffered by passengers in the vehi-
cle. Relying on this statute, which applied as the lex loci delicti, the
trial court dismissed the action on defendant's motion and the appellate
division reversed.
The Court of Appeals of New York reversed the appellate divi-
holding that when residents of Michigan are involved in an accident in another
state, the forum will apply its own law.
68. See 3 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 38.0311] (1982).
69. Id
70. Id
71. Plaintiffs in Upgren v. Executive Aviation Servs. Inc., 326 F. Supp. 709 (D. Md.
1971), a product liability action, unsuccessfully sought to invoke this public policy
exception, previously recognized by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Hender-
son v. Henderson, 199 Md. 449, 87 A.2d 403 (1952). Under lex loci delicti Minne-
sota law, as the place of the injury, applied-including its damage limit of $35,000
under the state's wrongful death statute. There was no monetary limit in Mary-
land's wrongful death statute. Defendants sought to reduce the ad damnum, and
plaintiff argued that to do so would be repugnant to the public policy of Mary-
land. The court failed to find a public policy sufficient to justify the proposed
course of action.
72. For example, in Chance v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 371 F. Supp. 439
(E.D.N.Y. 1974), Judge Weinstein stated that Babcock "marked the beginning of
a new era in choice-of-law analysis in the tort area." Id at 444.
73. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
74. See Comment, Babcock v. Jackson.: The Transition from the Lex Loci Delicti Rule
to the Dominant Contacts Approach, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1358 (1964).
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sion.7 5 Noting that the vested rights doctrine which had formed the
conceptual foundation of the lex loci delicti rule had long since been
discredited, the court stated: "U]ustice, fairness and 'the best practical
result'. . . may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law
of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the
occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific is-
sue raised in the litigation. '7 6 Applying its newly adopted approach,
the court held that the concern of New York was unquestionably the
greater and more direct, and that the interest of Ontario was, at best,
minimal.
This particular grouping of contacts or center of gravity approach
to determining the substantive tort law applicable to a given case
quickly devolved into an exercise in the mere counting of contacts
without an evaluation of the significance of each." Courts failed to
evaluate the quality of those contacts or the interest of the particular
jurisdictions involved in the controversy. It became as rigid and inflex-
ible a rule as was the displaced lex loci delicti concept. For this reason,
it has not been widely followed. However, New York courts continue
to adhere to it as their choice of law rule. 78
C Most Signofcant Relationship Test
In those jurisdictions that have reconsidered their rules on conflict
of laws in tort actions, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
approach has been the favored alternative.79 Choice of law is to be
determined under the Restatement (Second) approach according to
which jurisdiction has the most significant relationship to the occur-
75. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
76. Id. at 478, 191 N.E.2d at 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 746. The court noted that this
approach had been adopted in the then most recent revision of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS in the field of torts.
77. See Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 301 N.E.2d 519 (1969).
78. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Coldway Food Express Co., 90 A.D.2d 459, 454 N.Y.S.2d
837 (1982); Able Cycle Engines, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 84 A.D.2d 140, 445
N.Y.S.2d 469 (1981).
79. See, e.g., Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980); Inger-
soll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970); Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co.,
443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412
(1973); Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967).
Herbert Wechsler, then Director of the American Law Institute, noted that
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) constitutes a "fresh treatment" of the subject which
takes into account "enormous change in dominant judicial thought respecting
conflicts problems" that took place in the years preceding publication of the Offi-
cial Draft: "[t]he essence of that change has been the jettisoning of rigid rules in
favor of standards of greater flexibility, according sensitivity in judgment to im-
portant values that formerly were ignored. . . . The result presents a striking
contrast to the first Restatement in which dogma was so thoroughly enshrined."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS vii (1971). Despite this change,




rence and to the parties."0 A black letter rule of law secondarily states
which law the courts will usually apply to a given subject. 8 The most
significant relationship test thus ensures "the dynamic element in
choice of law adjudication without losing the degree of guidance past
decisions may afford."82
This approach to choice of law is aptly illustrated by the Restate-
ment (Second)'s rule for tort choice of law problems. In light of section
six's broad choice-of-law principles, the general principle for torts is as
follows:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an
issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state
which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant rela-
tionship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles
stated m § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the princi-
ples of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incor-
poration and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue. 3
There are then secondary rules for personal injuries,84 injuries to tangi-
80. The RESTATEMENT provides:
§ 6. Choice of Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory
directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of
the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be ap-
plied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
81. See, e.g., id § 145.
82. Id vii.
83. Id § 145 (emphasis added).
84. Id § 146 (local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights
and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other
state has a more significant relationship, under the principles stated in section six,
to the occurrence and the parties).
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ble things, 5 fraud and misrepresentation, 6 and death actions. 87
In commenting on the position taken by the original Restate-
ment, 88 the Reporters specifically stated that the last event rule did not
always work well, because situations arise where the state of the last
event (place of injury) bears only a slight relationship to the occurrence
and the parties with respect to the particular issue. 9 Therefore, they
rejected the vested rights approach in favor of an approach which takes
into account the tort's relationship to a particular case.9"
D. The Governmental Interest Analysis
Though the governmental interests and policies of the jurisdictions
involved are merely factors in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of
Law approach to choice of law problems,9' a methodology has devel-
oped where they predominate. The governmental interest analysis, first
comprehensively developed by Professor Brainerd Currie,92 has been
adopted by the California courts as their choice of law rule under a
refinement termed the comparative impairment analysis.93 This ap-
85. Id § 147 (local law of the state where the injury occurred).
86. Id § 148 ((1) when the plaintiffs action in reliance took place in the state where
the false representations were made and received, the local law of the state deter-
mines the rights and liabilities of the parties; and (2) when the plaintiffs action in
reliance took place in whole or in part in a state other than that where the false
representations were made, forum to consider contacts present in the particular
case in determining the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the
most significant relationship).
87. Id. § 175 (local law of the state where the death occurred).
88. Id § 377.
89. Id § 145 introductory note.
90. Id
91. Under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), factors relevant to the choice of the applica-
ble rule of law include the relevant policies of the forum and of other interested
states, and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particu-
lar issue. Id § 6 (2).
92. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); see also Currie,
The Constitution and Choice of Law.- Go vernmental Interests and the Judicial Func-
tion, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9 (1958). In Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d. 313,
546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. .215 (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976), the
California court called Professor Currie the "father of the governmental interest
approach." Id at 320, 546 P.2d at 722, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
93. The governmental interest analysis was spawned and matured in a trilogy of non-
product liability cases. The Supreme Court of California first articulated its use of
the approach in Justice Traynor's opinion in Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432
P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). This wrongful death action arose out of an
automobile collision in Missouri. Defendant was a California resident and plain-
tiffs wife, the operator of the other vehicle, was killed and his two sons were
injured. Plaintiff and his family, Ohio residents at the time of the collision, were
on their way to California. California was the state of plaintiff's residence at the
time of suit. At that time, Missouri limited wrongful death recovery to $25,000;
Ohio and California did not.
Justice Traynor applied Ohio law, rejecting the lex loci delicti approach to
choice of law. He found that California law had no interest on plaintiff's behalf
since the plaintiff was not a California resident on the date of the occurrence, and
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proach has not been as widely received as the Restatement (Second)
approach, though it is popular among scholars.
In Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 94 the Supreme Court
of California described the general steps required by the comparative
impairment analysis. First, the court must examine the substantive law
of each jurisdiction having contact with a transaction to determine if
their laws differ as applied to the transaction. If they do not, then the
court is presented with a "false conflict," and no choice is required.'-
Second, if the substantive law does differ, the court must determine
no interest on defendant's behalf since it had no recovery limit. He therefore
dismissed California from consideration. As between Missouri and Ohio, he
found no substantial Missouri interest which conflicted with Ohio's interest in
fully compensating survivors.
In Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr.
106 (1974) (en banc), the court further refined its analysis and decided that Cali-
fornia, as the forum state, would apply its own measure of damages in a wrongful
death action by Mexican citizens against California residents. The suit arose out
of a California accident in which a Mexican citizen was killed. Mexico, the court
held, had no interest in the application of its limitation of damages rule in the
case.
Finally, in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 215 (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976), the court held that Nevada
tavern owners who actively solicited California business were liable for injuries
proximately caused by the sale of alcoholic beverages to intoxicated patrons. De-
spite the fact that Nevada did not recognize such a cause of action, when a Cali-
fornia resident was injured in an automobile accident occurring in California
recovery was permitted.
94. 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978) (en banc). In Offshore
Rental the issue was whether the trial court appropriately determined that Louisi-
ana law, not California law, governed the right to bring suit for loss of a key
employee. In affirming, the court noted that Louisiana has a significant interest in
regulating the avoidance of extended financial hardship to their citizens. The
court reasoned that the burden to obtain insurance for these types of actions is
better borne by California employers.
95. Occasionally, what would appear initially to be a conflict of law problem may, on
further examination, reveal that no choice need be made; hence, it is termed a
"false" conflict. Courts and commentators, while they agree that such a thing
exists, disagree as to what it is.
All do agree that if the laws of the relevant states are the same, and would
produce the same result, there is no conflict requiring a choice. For example, in
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 430 F. Supp. 134 (D. Alaska
1977), plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for economic loss because of
wing crack defects in four aircraft purchased from the defendant. Defendant
moved to dismiss the strict liability claim. Three states-Alaska, Washington,
and Georgia-had contacts with the transaction. The court examined the law of
each, and found that this theory of recovery was not available on the facts in any
of the interested jurisdictions. At that time, neither Alaska nor Washington per-
mitted recovery for economic loss on a strict liability theory. In Georgia, the the-
ory of strict liability was not available to a corporate entity such as the plaintiff. It
therefore dismissed the strict liability count and avoided the conflict issue. See
also Continental Oil Co. v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 409 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.
Tex. 1976); Paoletto v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 464 F.2d 976 (3d Cir. 1972).
False conflicts of this type, making choice of law academic, are more likely to
present themselves in product actions premised on warranty theories than those
premised on negligence or strict liability theories. Since the warranty provisions
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whether each jurisdiction has an interest in having its law applied. If
only one jurisdiction has such an interest, then its law will apply be-
cause there is no "true conflict." Finally, when there is a "true conflict"
the court proceeds under the comparative impairment approach to de-
termine which jurisdiction's interest would be more impaired if its pol-
icy were subordinated to the policy of the other.96 The conflict is
resolved by applying the law of the jurisdiction whose interest would
be more impaired if its laws were not applied.97
of Article 2 of the UCC have been adopted in 49 states, it will be infrequent that a
product action will have contacts with a non-Code state.
On a different level, some courts and scholars maintain that the "governmen-
tal interest" behind the law of each state involved must be examined. If there is
not a substantial conflict between the jurisdictions' policies or interests in the par-
ticular factual context in which the question arises then the conflict is false or
avoidable. See generally Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 754 (1963); Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve
True Conflicts.- An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 577
(1980).
This type of "false conflict" is aptly demonstrated in two nonproduct deci-
sions which were previously discussed. In Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d
574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974) (en banc), Mexico's interest in its
damage limit for wrongful death was to protect defendants from excessive
financial burdens or exaggerated claims. Since the defendants were California
residents, Mexico had no interest in applying its damage limits. Thus, there was
no true conflict between governmental interests which would require a court to
choose between them. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719,
128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976), involved a true
conflict between the Nevada interest in protecting tavern owners from excessive
liability and California's interest in compensating victims of intoxicated drivers.
96. The Supreme Court of California in Offshore Rental elaborated on the manner in
which this determination is to be made:
As Professor Horowitz has explained, this analysis does not involve the
court in "weighing" the conflicting governmental interests "in the sense
of determining which conflicting law manifest[s] the 'better' or the 'wor-
thier' social policy on the specific issue. An attempted balancing of con-
flicting state policies in that sense . . is difficult to justify in the context
of a federal system in which, within constitutional limits, states are em-
powered to mold their policies as they wish."
In sum, the comparative impairment approach to the resolution of true
conflicts attempts to determine the relative commitment of the respective
states to the laws involved. The approach incorporates general factors
for consideration: the history and current status of the states' laws and
the function and purpose of those laws.
Offshore Rental, 22 Cal. 3d at 165-66, 583 P.2d at 726-27, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73
(citations omitted).
97. California has exhibited a definite pro-forum tendency in its disposition of choice
of law problems under the Reich analysis. The Hurtado court endorsed this
tendency:
[g]enerally speaking, the forum will apply its own rule of decision unless
a party litigant timely invokes the law of a foreign state. In such event,
he must demonstrate that the latter rule of decision will further the inter-
est of the foreign state and therefore that it is an appropriate one for the
forum to apply to the case before it.
11 Cal. 3d at 581, 522 P.2d at 670, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
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Though adopted, developed, and refined in a series of nonproduct
liability cases, the government interest analysis has been utilized con-
sistently in product liability cases applying California choice of law
rules.98 Browne v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 99 is a particularly instruc-
tive example of the analysis required under this approach. Browne in-
volved wrongful death claims arising out of the midair collision of a
Hawker Siddley Trident 3 and a McDonnell Douglas DC-9 near
Zagreb, Yugoslavia. At the time of the collision, both planes were
under "positive control" by the air traffic control center at Zagreb.
Plaintiffs' allegations of defectiveness related to the visibility aspects of
the design of the cockpit for the DC-9. The DC-9 was manufactured in
California, but owned and operated by a Yugoslavian airline. The Tri-
dent 3 was owned and operated by British Airways. Crews and passen-
gers of both were nationals from Yugoslavia, England, Turkey, West
Germany, and Australia. Plaintiffs were heirs of passengers from Eng-
land, Germany, Australia, and Turkey. Though McDonnell Douglas
was the sole defendant in this action, there were several actions pend-
ing in Yugoslavia."°°
Plaintiff argued that California law applied to the substantive is-
sues of liability and damages, and that California's rule imposing joint
and several liability also applied. Defendants claimed that Yugoslav-
ian law governed the strict liability and joint and several liability is-
sues, and that the substantive law of the various plaintiffs' domiciles
governed the issue of damages.'' The court held that Yugoslavia's law
of proportionate liability was to be applied to the claim against Mc-
Donnell Douglas, but that California law would apply to the remaining
issues of strict liability and wrongful death recovery.
10 2
The court first found no compelling reason to displace California's
law of strict liability. The plane had been manufactured and designed
there, and the fact that it could have been resold in the United States
gave California a continuing interest in the soundness of its design.
Moreover, Yugoslavia recognized a cause of action for "objective lia-
bility," which was similar to strict liability. Therefore, a choice be-
tween the two was not necessary. Finally, the court found that the
plaintiffs' states of domicile had no interest in recovery for their resi-
dents against nonresident defendants. 0 3
On the issue of joint and several liability the court found that since
none of the plaintiffs were California residents, California's interest in
providing maximum recovery for its residents was not implicated. Yu-
98. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill., 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981);
Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1980); Rocky Mountain Helicopters,
Inc. v. Bell Helicopter Co., 491 F. Supp. 611 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
99. 504 F. Supp. 514 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
100. Id at 519.
101. Id at 516.
102. Id
103. Id at 518.
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goslavian law differed from California's in its adherence to the propor-
tionate liability principle under which a defendant is held to pay only
that portion of the damages for which he is responsible. Since Califor-
nia had no interest in applying its own law of proportionate liability,
and the interests of Yugoslavia would be advanced, the court utilized
Yugoslavia's law."'I
The California courts continue to follow the governmental interest
analysis approach to choice of law issues. Though it has not been
widely followed by other jurisdictions, it continues to be popular in the
literature,' 0 5 and a few courts have applied their own modified version
of it.,,
104. Id
105. See, e.g., Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An
Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 577 (1980).
106. In Sibley v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines, 454 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the
Southern District of New York, as transferee court from a Massachusetts federal
court, applied Massachusetts' governmental interest analysis rule. The Massachu-
setts Wrongful Death Act, which provided for punitive damages, was held not to
apply in this diversity action to recover damages for the death of a Massachusetts
domiciliary killed in a collision between the aircraft in which he was riding and a
Dutch aircraft in Spain. Citing the purpose of punitive damages as deterrence
and punishment, the court said that no significant interest of Massachusetts would
be promoted because the allegedly tortious conduct of the Dutch defendant oc-
curred in Spain, not in Massachusetts. Id at 429.
Derivative local theories of the major tort choice of law rules continue to be
generated. For example, Rhode Island has rejected the lex loci delicti rule in
favor of "interest weighing." This modern approach is a hybrid consisting of as-
pects of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)'S most significant relationship approach and
California's governmental interest analysis. The approach has also been called a
choice-influencing considerations approach. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considera-
tions in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966). In Woodward v. Stewart,
104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917, cert. denied 393 U.S. 957 (1968), the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island summarized the interests to be considered under the approach:
(1) predictability of results; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order;
(3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmen-
tal interests; and (5) application of the better rule of law. Id at 299, 243 A.2d at
923, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 957 (1968).
Advancement of the forum's governmental interest was the determinative
factor in the First Circuit's application of the choice influencing considerations
rule in Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1977). Decedent, a
Rhode Island resident, was killed in an automobile accident in Massachusetts
when the vehicle in which he was riding was struck by another vehicle, operated
by a Massachusetts resident. Plaintiff was a Rhode Island resident; the vehicle
was purchased in Massachusetts. Massachusetts imposed a $50,000 limit on
wrongful death recovery; Rhode Island did not. Additionally, the court assumed
that strict liability would be a permissible theory of recovery in Massachusetts;
however, it would be inappropriate in Rhode Island.
The court affirmed the trial courts' application of Rhode Island law to both
issues. On the damage issue, it held that Rhode Island had a strong interest in
assuming adequate compensation for its citizens for wrongful death. Inasmuch as
Ford was not a Massachusetts corporation, this did not harm interstate order. The
court found the remaining three factors inconclusive. On the strict liability issue,
the court found that Rhode Island had a strong interest in strict liability as a
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V. SELECTION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN CONTRACT
Plaintiffs typically premise product liability actions on both tort
and warranty theories. Though there exists a uniform statutory choice
of law rule for warranty actions, some jurisdictions continue to ignore
this directive and apply a variety of choice of law rules to warranty
actions. 07 In either event, a result of differing choice of law rules for
tort and warranty actions is the applicability of different substantive
law to different issues in the same case.
A. The Warranty Action Dimension
Choice of law problems in actions premised in whole or in part on
theories of breach of express and implied warranties have been greatly
ameliorated by the general enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code. The Code provisions, particularly those of Article Two, have
been enacted in all American states, except Louisiana, in the District of
Columbia, and in the Virgin Islands.108 The old Uniform Sales Act
had no provision for dealing with choice of law issues when a transac-
tion involved the law of more than one jurisdiction. These issues were
resolved in a multi-step process. A court would first characterize a
product liability action premised on a warranty theory as sounding in
tort or contract, and then apply the relevant traditional choice of law
rule to that determination.' °9
Though these difficulties have been ameliorated, they have not
ceased to exist. When modem commercial activity is international, the
law of foreign non-Code jurisdictions is involved in disputes. Even in
national or regional product liability litigation, not all states have en-
acted the uniform version of Article Two." 0 Furthermore, among
those states with the uniform version, different sections have been sub-
ject to differing judicial interpretations."' Recent product liability de-
means to protect its citizens from defective products. Application of Rhode Island
law, the court determined, would not offend Massachusetts law or policy.
107. See infra notes 121-26.
108. See supra note 18.
109. See, e.g., Bilancia v. General Motors Corp., 538 F.2d 621 (4th Cir. 1976); Prashker
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
110. In his treatise on the UCC, Anderson writes:
The most likely source of interstate conflict as to rules of law would arise
where one or some of the states involved have adopted a later Code
amendment that was not adopted by the other states involved. Here
there will be a conflict of Code versions and the choice of law will be
significant when there is an actual substantive difference between the
Code versions. When the later amendment involved merely clarifies the
earlier version of the Code or codifies decisions thereunder, it is more
likely that there will in fact be a true uniformity that makes a choice of
law academic. Even though all states having any contact with the trans-
action have adopted the same version of the Code, the choice of law may
retain importance when it is necessary to resort to the pre-Code law.
1 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105:8 (1981).
111. The notice requirement of section 2-607(3)(a) is an example of a uniform statute
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cisions confirm the continued existence of choice of law problems in the
warranty area." 2
B. (.CC. Section 1-105
Contrary to the disparate and confusing choice of law rules which
pervade the tort field, there exists a single statutory directive by which
choice of law issues are to be resolved under the Uniform Commercial
Code. The principle is contained in Article One of the Code, which
sets forth rules of construction applicable to all transactions grounded
in the Code. It therefore applies to the warranty provisions as well as
to other Code articles. Section 1-105(1) provides in relevant part:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a
transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to
another state or nation the parties may agree that the law
either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern
their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Act ap-
plies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this
state. 1 ' 3
Since all fifty-one jurisdictions have enacted this provision in essen-
tially the same form, it is virtually a uniform rule of choice of law.'I
The first significant feature of the section is its affirmative recogni-
that has been subject to differing judicial interpretations. The section provides as
follows: "(3) Where a tender has been accepted: (a) the buyer must within a
reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify
the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy." UCC § 2-607(3)(a) (1978).
The majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have held that
the word "seller" as used therein refers only to the buyer's immediate seller. See,
e.g., Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 378 N.E.2d 1083 (1978);
Carson v. Chevron Chemical Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 776, 635 P.2d 1248 (1981);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 53 Md. App. 106, 452 A.2d 192 (1982),
aJ'dper curiam, 456 A.2d 930 (1983); Vintage Homes, Inc. v. Coldiron, 585
S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
Several courts, however, have concluded or assumed that section 2-607(3)(a)
does require timely notice to a "remote seller." See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon
Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976); Western Equip. v. Sheridan Iron Works,
605 P.2d 806 (Wyo. 1980).
112. See, e.g., Delhomme Indus., Inc. v. Houston Beechcraft, Inc., 669 F.2d 1049 (5th
Cir. 1982) (validity of choice of law provision in contract for the sale of an air-
plane); Teel v. American Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (priv-
ity and limitations issues in a warranty action); Sellon v. General Motors Corp.,
521 F. Supp. 978 (D. Del. 1981) (characterization issues).
113. U.C.C. § 1-105(l)(1978).
114. See I R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105 (1981). The only
significant local variation of section 1-105 is in Mississippi. Mississippi adds the
following paragraph at the end of subsection (1):
Provided, however, the law of the State of Mississippi shall always gov-
ern the rights and duties of the parties in regard to disclaimers of implied
warranties of merchantability or fitness, limitations of remedies for
breaches of implied warranties of merchantability or fitness, or the ne-
cessity for privity of contract to maintain a civil action for breach of
implied warranties of merchantability or fitness notwithstanding any
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tion of the right of parties to a transaction to choose their own law.
They are subject to the rules stated in the sections listed in subsection
(2), but none of them affect section 1-105 insofar as a product liability
action is premised on a warranty theory. The transaction also is re-
quired by the section to bear a "reasonable relation" to the chosen ju-
risdiction." 5  From a product liability perspective, however, it is
unlikely that parties to the typical sales transaction will specify the law
which is to govern. This provision is more likely to be invoked under
Code transactions that contemplate a future course of dealings between
the parties. 1 1 6
Absent an agreement between the parties, section 1-105(1) provides
that the forum's UCC applies to transactions bearing an "appropriate
relation" to that state. If a transaction takes place in its entirety in a
particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction's Code will apply. However,
comment 3 indicates that when a transaction has significant contacts
both with a state which has enacted the Code and with other jurisdic-
tions, the question of what relation is "appropriate" is left to judicial
agreement by the parties that the law of some other state or nation shall
govern the rights and duties of the parties.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-1-105 (1972).
115. The UCC provides:
1. Subsection (1) states affirmatively the right of the parties to a
multistate transaction or a transaction involving foreign trade to choose
their own law. That right is subject to the firm rules stated in the six
sections listed in subsection (2), and is limited to jurisdictions to which
the transaction bears a "reasonable relation." In general, the test of
"reasonable relation" is similar to that laid down by the Supreme Court
in Seaman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927). Ordina-
rily the law chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a significant
enough portion of the making or performance of the contract is to occur
or occurs. But an agreement as to choice of law may sometimes take
effect as a shorthand expression of the intent of the parties as to matters
governed by their agreement, even though the transaction has no signifi-
cant contact with the jurisdiction chosen.
UCC § 1-105 comment 1 (1978).
The question in Seaman was whether the Pennsylvania or New York usury
statute would govern a loan transaction between a New York borrower and a
Pennsylvania lender. The loan agreement did not specify the law which was to
apply. The parties signed the contract in Pennsylvania, and it provided for per-
formance in that state. This was done so that Pennsylvania's usury law would
apply; the agreement was unenforceable under New York's usury law. In apply-
ing Pennsylvania law, the Court said the loan would be upheld if it was valid
either at the place of making or at the place of performance. The Court did add a
good faith limitation and a requirement of "normal relation" between the transac-
tion and the stipulated land. 274 U.S. at 408.
116. Occasionally, however, parties to a "one-shot" sales transaction do specify con-
trolling law. In R&L Grain Co. v. Chicago Eastern Corp., 531 F. Supp. 201 (N.D.
Ill. 1981), the parties to a contract of sale of a grain storage bin expressly agreed
that the contract would be governed by Illinois substantive law. Plaintiff later
sued for property damage and damages for economic loss sustained when the roof
of the bin collapsed. Finding that the "appropriate relation" to Illinois existed
because the defendant resided there and the contract was executed there, the court
enforced the parties' agreement to make Illinois law binding. Id at 206.
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determination. '17
Generally, the "appropriate relation" test of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code has been considered the equivalent of modem conflict of
law concepts.1 1 8 Courts thus determine whether a jurisdiction bears an
appropriate relation by evaluating the relationship of a particular
transaction to the relevant jurisdictions."l 9 For example, in Owens-
Corning Fiberglas v. Sonic Development Corp., 120 an action for breach
of warranty was brought against the manufacturer of three air com-
pressors. The Kansas court found that an appropriate relation existed
between the transaction and the State because defendant had shipped
the air compressors into Kansas, they had been used in Kansas, and the
breach, if any, occurred in Kansas.
Maryland is one of many jurisdictions that does not use section 1-
105 as its choice of law rule in a warranty context. The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland has stated that the law of the place of sale deter-
mines the extent and effect of the warranties which arise.' 2 ' This place
of sale rule has been applied specifically in product liability actions
premised, in part, on warranty theories. In Volkswagen ofAmerica, Inc.
v. Young, 122 the allegedly defective vehicle was purchased in Alabama
and the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated:
The general rule, to which we adhere is that "the law of the
place of the sale determines the extent and effect of the war-
117. The UCC provides:
[t]he mere fact that suit is brought in a state does not make it appro-
priate to apply the substantive law of that state. Cases where a relation
to the enacting state is not "appropriate" include, for example, those
where the parties have clearly contracted on the basis of some other law,
as where the law of the place of contracting and the law of the place of
contemplated performance are the same and are contrary to the law
under the code.
UCC § 1-105 comment 2 (1978).
118. "[T]he Code does not define what constitutes an appropriate relation of a transac-
tion to a state and therefore general principles of conffict of laws will be applied in
such cases." I R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105 (1981).
119. See, e.g., Wentworth v. Kawasaki, 508 F. Supp. 1114, 1115 (D.N.H. 1981); Conti-
nental Oil Co. v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 409 F. Supp. 288, 290-91 (S.D. Tex.
1976); Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 293 S.E.2d 405 (1982).
120. 546 F. Supp. 533 (D. Kan. 1982).
121. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974). The
United States District Court for the District of Maryland had earlier predicted, in
Upgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 709 (D. Md. 1971), that if
confronted with the issue, the state court of appeals would apply the lex loci delicti
rule to an implied warranty action, on the grounds that it bears such a close rela-
tionship to one based in tort. Id at 716.
Even after the court of appeals proved the Upgren prediction incorrect as to
the lex loci delicti rule, it has been successfully argued that warranty is nonetheless
akin to tort for other purposes. In Loh. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 47 Md. App. 110,
422 A.2d 16 (1980), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland concluded that an
action in warranty can be a claim in tort for purposes of the Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1979).
122. 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
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ranties which attend the sale." Since the Volkswagen was
purchased in Alabama, the law of that State determines
whether a cause of action for breach of warranty was
alleged. 123
In Frericks v. General Motors Corp. 124 Maryland law was applied to
determine the sufficiency of the warranty counts because the vehicle
had been sold in Maryland. 25
None of the referenced Maryland decisions have cited or relied on
section 1-105 of the UCC. 26 The lex loci contractus rule, if rigidly and
consistently applied, would controvert the intention of the express stat-
utory directive contained in the UCC. Section 1-105 contemplates that
when a transaction has significant contacts with more than one jurisdic-
tion, the question as to which law should apply is left to judicial deci-
sion. Appropriateness of law should be the basis for the choice in any
given factual pattern. A hard and fast rule like lex loci contractus ig-
nores contacts which a transaction may have with jurisdictions other
than those in which the sale occurred, and ignores the interests of the
involved jurisdictions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Absent uniformity in the substantive premises of product liability,
choice of law questions will persist. Since uniformity is not likely soon,
it is important to be able to resolve choice of law questions. For the
practitioner, it is even more significant to be able to make affirmative
tactical use of applicable choice of law rules.
In the tort area, the choice of law rule which is most compatible
with modern product liability law is the most significant relationship
approach. It is flexible yet structured, and the concerns addressed by
other modern theories are incorporated in its general principles and
black letter rules.
The Restatement (Second)'s most significant relationship approach
has a dimension not present in the grouping of contacts principle. Both
approaches necessarily involve a consideration of relevant contacts
with a particular jurisdiction. However, the Restatement (Second) ap-
proach requires consideration of the quality of the contacts, not just
their quantity.
The earlier, near universal following of the lex loci delicti rule, and
123. Id at 220, 321 A.2d at 747 (citations omitted). Interestingly, the cases cited by the
court for support were pre-UCC cases from other jurisdictions.
124. 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975).
125. Id at 299, 336 A.2d at 125.
126. Other courts have also applied the place of sale rule, without discussing the appli-
cation of UCC section 1-105 or the appropriate relation rule. See, e.g., Begley v.
Ford Motor Co., 476 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1973); Stubblefield v. Johnson-Fagg, Inc.,




the consequent uniformity which it produced, is gone. With less than
half of the states continuing to adhere to it, the trend is clearly towards
its abandonment. Lex loci delicti's rigid adherence to a single fortui-
tous circumstance is at loggerheads with the policy considerations of
emerging product liability law. Courts have engrafted exceptions upon
it, and engaged in strained analyses because of its rigidity. The rule's
uniformity and predictability have therefore been undermined.
However, governmental interest analysis swings the pendulum too
far. It requires a court to focus solely on those interests and policies
instead of on the facts. The result is often a decision holding that the
law of the forum applies. Moreover, it is a rule that provides little, if
any, predictability.
The Restatement (Second) approach provides both the flexibility
which the lex loci delicti rule lacks, and the predictability which the
governmental interest analysis rule cannot provide. It specifies the law
which is to apply to a given tort action, and at the same time makes
clear that the directive can be ignored if another jurisdiction has a more
significant relationship to the events giving rise to the litigation.
In the contract area, the UCC specifies that an appropriate relation
test is to govern choice of law decisions in breach of warranty actions.
In those jurisdictions which adhere to this rule in the warranty area and
the most significant relationship test in the tort area, the same choice of
law rule is applied to all causes of action in a given product liability
lawsuit, whether sounding in tort or contract. This produces a uni-
formity in the applicable law which does not exist in jurisdictions with
differing rules.
Presently, the substantive law of product liability varies from juris-
diction to jurisdiction. Therefore, choice of law decisions can be out-
come determinative. In order to take advantage of these differences,
the practitioner must educate himself on the relevant choice of law
rules to be able to use them to his tactical advantage.
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